The Impact of Downsizing and Efficiency Measures on Anti-Fraud Resources by Palasinski, Marek
The Qualitative Report
Volume 18 | Number 45 Article 1
11-11-2013




Follow this and additional works at: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr
Part of the Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons, and
the Social Statistics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Qualitative Report at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Qualitative Report by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
Recommended APA Citation
Palasinski, M. (2013). The Impact of Downsizing and Efficiency Measures on Anti-Fraud Resources. The Qualitative Report, 18(45),
1-16. Retrieved from http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol18/iss45/1
The Impact of Downsizing and Efficiency Measures on Anti-Fraud
Resources
Abstract
The main purpose of this study was to explore the impact of downsizing and efficiency measures on two key
elements of operational performance - fraud detection and fraud reporting. Qualitative data were obtained
from ethnographic observations of two major multinational insurance companies, which were already
examined before the Global Financial Crisis, and subjected to an inter - and intra - business comparative
analysis of anti - fraud resources. The paper points out a big discrepancy in opinions on the downsizing effects
between junior staff and their supervisors. Whereas the latter present them as enabling the business to deal
with suspicious claims more quickly, the former offer a contrastingly different view in which the constantly
growing pressure often lea ds to suspicious claims getting approved. By validating the practical implications of
a purposefully adapted version of resource - based theory, the paper illustrates the inviability of subjecting anti
- fraud resources to the same levels of downsizing and efficiency as other business resources. Although the
literature on the general negative impact of downsizing on the broadly - defined operational performance is
growing, this is the first major study to examine its impact on insurance anti - fraud processes and illustrate
their changes following the Global Financial Crisis.
Keywords
Efficiency Measures, Ethnography, Insurance Fraud
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.
This article is available in The Qualitative Report: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol18/iss45/1
The Qualitative Report 2013 Volume 18, Article 89, 1-16  
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR18/palasinski89.pdf    
 
The Impact of Downsizing and Efficiency  
Measures on Anti-Fraud Resources 
 
Marek Palasinski 
Lancaster University, Lancashire, United Kingdom 
 
The main purpose of this study was to explore the impact of downsizing and 
efficiency measures on two key elements of operational performance - fraud 
detection and fraud reporting. Qualitative data were obtained from 
ethnographic observations of two major multinational insurance companies, 
which were already examined before the Global Financial Crisis, and 
subjected to an inter- and intra-business comparative analysis of anti-fraud 
resources. The paper points out a big discrepancy in opinions on the 
downsizing effects between junior staff and their supervisors. Whereas the 
latter present them as enabling the business to deal with suspicious claims 
more quickly, the former offer a contrastingly different view in which the 
constantly growing pressure often leads to suspicious claims getting 
approved. By validating the practical implications of a purposefully adapted 
version of resource-based theory, the paper illustrates the inviability of 
subjecting anti-fraud resources to the same levels of downsizing and efficiency 
as other business resources. Although the literature on the general negative 
impact of downsizing on the broadly-defined operational performance is 
growing, this is the first major study to examine its impact on insurance anti-
fraud processes and illustrate their changes following the Global Financial 
Crisis. Keywords: Efficiency Measures, Ethnography, Insurance Fraud 
  
The Impact of Downsizing and Efficiency Measures on Anti-fraud Resources 
 
While some research shows positive effects of workforce reduction on organizational 
performance (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Demuse, Vanderheiden & Bergman, 1994), there are 
also studies revealing its disruptive nature (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Cascio, 1993; 
Krishnan & Park, 2002). The “mean and lean” attempts to improve productivity through 
downsizing, defined as an intentional reduction in personnel intended to improve the 
efficiency or effectiveness of the firm (Freeman & Cameron, 1993), have been regarded as 
the preferred route since the mid 1980’s (Laabs, 1990). They almost inevitably lead to layoff 
survivors having to pick up at least some of their departed colleagues’ tasks (Lewin & 
Johnston, 2000), which can lower their morale (Mishra, Mishra, & Spreitzer, 2009; Petzall, 
Parker, & Stoeberl, 2000), increase anxiety (Brockner et al., 1986; Brockner, Grover, Reed, 
& DeWitt, 1992), absenteeism (Cascio, 1993) and impair performance (Fisher & White, 
2000; Krishnan & Park, 2002).  
By equating downsizing with cutting cost through an across the board reduction of 
headcount, many executives adopt an excessively short-sighted approach that seems to result 
in star performers being given incentives to leave, depleting crucial skills in human resources 
and creating the need for patch-up solutions that newly hired consultants are paid to find (De 
Vries & Balazs, 1996). In this light, and given the quite well-established literature on 
downsizing, the reader would be right to ask what new contribution is attempted to be made 
in this study which examines restructuring in the motor insurance industry. Is there anything 
new to say? I argue that whilst the general examination of downsizing effects is important, its 
breadth might be in conducive to gleaning the subtle micro-level details that could come to 
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light if individual aspects of operational performance, like fraud detection and fraud 
reporting, were analyzed.  
Quite a lot of research has already focused on the types of fraudsters (Clarke, 1989), 
on their characteristics (Palasinski, 2009) and on how and why fraud is committed (Gill, 
Woolley & Gill, 1994; Doig, Jones, & Wait, 1999). Dodd (1998) reports that the forms of 
insurance fraud vary widely - from amateur and opportunistic claimants making false 
statements through to organized networks engaging in sophisticated scams. According to the 
Crime and Fraud Prevention Bureau (2000), the most typical forms are: reporting inflated 
loss value (39%), misrepresenting circumstances (32%), making completely false claims 
(12%), claiming from multiple insurers (3%), and using less conventional methods (14%). 
 Researchers have also studied the responses of the insurance industry to fraud. They 
note that despite some similarities in how fraud is tackled, there are considerable differences 
in the adopted tactics (Clarke, 1990), in the definition of fraud (Doig, Jones, & Wait, 1999) 
and in fraud detection methods. The methods may include a voice stress analysis (Horvath, 
1982), statistical analysis (Artis, Ayuso, & Guillen, 2002), anti-fraud software analysis 
(Morley, Ball, & Ormerod, 2006), “suspicion-building” IT toolset (Ormerod, Ball, & Morley, 
2012) and claims auditing strategies (Schiller, 2006; Tennyson & Salsas-Forn, 2002). Even 
before the Global Financial Crisis, however, there was unanimous recognition of fraud as a 
major problem (Dodd, 1998; Litton, 1990; Ormerod, Morley, Ball, Langley, & Spencer, 
2003). 
Thus, the complexity of insurance fraud can perhaps be only matched by its impact. 
According to a report by the Association of British Insurers (2009), its annual cost in the UK 
alone was estimated at just over £1 billion in 2001, £1.6 billion in 2007 and £1.9 billion in 
2009. The same report also highlights that more and more people are being caught trying to 
commit fraud by lying and withholding relevant information – a 30% increase on 2007. 
These statistics indicate that insurance fraud has been growing faster than the implementation 
of effective fraud detection and fraud reporting measures.  
Such measures were identified as poor prior to the Crisis. In a major ethnographic 
study of how the detection of insurance fraud succeeds and fails at two multinational 
companies, Morley et al. (2006) report that the major obstacles to investigating suspicious 
claims are organizational factors. More specifically, they note that frontline claims handlers, 
who are primarily responsible for the detection of fraudulent claims, are usually 
inexperienced (with the average company lifetime of less than two years), undertrained and 
overloaded with productivity targets.  
Morley et al. (2006) also describe the general business atmosphere at the two 
companies to be infused with speedy rather than careful claims-processing, where any 
individual sense ownership for claims is minimal, where feedback is limited and unreflective 
work is encouraged. For example, they note that the frontline staff, who receive no incentive 
for reporting their suspicions, are required to strictly stick to a telephone script and complete 
a checklist of fraud indicators, some of which describe suspicious claimants as aggressive, 
vague and hesitant. In a separate follow-up study, Palasinski (2009) shows that potential 
claimants are actually more likely to describe fraudsters as polite, accurate and cooperative, 
thus demonstrating the incorrectness of the image that the insurance industry still associates 
with fraudsters. Have such organizational factors changed since then? 
The losses suffered by the British and American financial institutions since the Crisis 
have run at trillions of pounds, leading to banks going virtually bankrupt, being taken over by 
the state or acquired by other institutions (Dewatripont, Rochet, & Tirole, 2010). Whereas 
most of the insurance industry in the European model went through the Crisis with relatively 
little difficulty, some of the more deregulated Anglo-Saxon industry had to be downsized, 
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nationalized or have its assets put on sale, leading to closures, mass redundancies, pay freezes 
and dramatic efficiency measures (Schich, 2009).  
Given a serious deficit in research on how such major restructuring can affect 
individual elements of operational performance, like anti-fraud resources, I analyze to what 
extent the two companies have incorporated the six major recommendations suggested to 
them in the pre-Crisis study by Morley et al. (2006). The recommendations include:  
 
1. offering incentives for spotting and reporting anomalies,  
2. offering increased and more regular training opportunities,  
3. developing organizational processes that integrate fraud-detection methods 
with claims-handling,  
4. making modern anti-fraud software more available and  
5. offering better training for the effective use of such software,  
6. as well as increasing a degree of ownership of claims.  
 
Tracing such changes, I respond to Birati and Tziner’s (2000) call for the exploration 
of potential impact that major organizational changes, like downsizing and new efficiency 
measures, can have on likely financial results of individual companies rather than on a more 
general economic climate. Given that downsizing often forces management to identify where 
they have the greatest competitive advantage and to revaluate their organizational structures 
to maximize that advantage (Griggs & Hyland, 2003), I draw on resource-based theory 
(Wernerfelt, 1984) that played a large role in shaping the direction and contents of my 
ethnographic observations. The theory has already been proven as an effective tool for 
assessing both the positive and negative effects of a major restructuring (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991; Krishnan & Park, 2002). Even though Priem and Butler (2001) criticize the 
theory for its alleged tautological character, conceptual vagueness and limited prescriptive 
limitations, Crook, Ketchen, Combs, and Todd (2008) argue that its usefulness in the 
identification, development, and distribution of value from strategic resources is high.  
Although one of the main precepts of the theory is that a sustainable competitive 
advantage stems from unique bundles of resources that competitors cannot imitate 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), in this study I adopt a more moderate stance by Barney (1991, p. 117) 
who interprets such resources as “neither perfectly imitable nor substitutable without great 
effort.” For the purposes of this research, then, the anti-fraud resources are defined as all 
assets, capabilities, organizational processes, and information helping the business to gain a 
sustained competitive advantage – the claims handlers’ ability and opportunity to detect and 
deal with insurance claims that they find suspicious, unusual and complex. I propose that the 
advantage might be potentially achieved by approaching the anti-fraud resources differently 
from other business resources and by not putting them under similar pressure of downsizing. 
Whilst this approach may seem quite imitable, the successful identification, testing and 
preservation of all such anti-fraud resources are complex and demanding. Furthermore, the 
individual qualitative structure and contents of the resources, which even similar businesses 





I adopted an ethnographic approach, which has been proven to be an effective tool for 
complementing statistical, interview and questionnaire methods (Hill, 2009). This approach 
allows for up-close and personal insights through participant observation and, unlike survey 
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and interview techniques, it has the capacity for illuminating complex social processes and 
work activities in a live natural environment (Seale, Gobo, Gubrium, & Silverman, 2004). 
 The procedure lasted for 3 weeks during different working hours at various times and 
involved a number of diverse and systematic activities, like observing and interacting with 
junior staff and their supervisors at different departments of the two different multinational 
insurance companies that were subject to a similar, albeit not restructuring-focused, 
ethnographic analysis before the Crisis (Morley et al., 2006). To maximize the possibility of 
drawing comparisons with that analysis, I focused only on the 20 junior staff and 6 
supervisors who admitted to having the experience of the pre-Crisis processes and 
procedures.  
I assured them all of anonymity and confidentially, and encouraged them to express 
themselves as openly as possible. I advised them that their opinions would not be shared with 
any staff members and that they were simply meant to enrich my study, which was 
introduced to them as exploration of business restructuring and anti-fraud practices. Sitting 
separately with both claims handlers and supervisors, I attended team and managerial 
meetings, each time carefully observing them, occasionally asking questions about the given 
activity and always trying to listen to what was going on around me.  
During the observations at the two companies, I took regular field notes and samples 
of documents describing a variety of work procedures that could fall into the category of anti-
fraud resources. I have not, however, obtained the permission to make audio recordings so, 
unable to take classical think-aloud protocols, I made bullet-point notes of what participants 
said they were doing. All the data could then be subjected to inter- and intra-business 
comparative analyses of the anti-fraud resources, giving insight into the differences between 
the two companies and the individual changes they have made since the Crisis (see Tables 1 




The perspectives of junior staff 
 
When asked about the changes introduced to their workplace in the last three years, 
the claims handlers at the two companies were highly critical of them. They complained 
about constantly increasing workload, closer monitoring and the approach of “a stick” rather 
than “a carrot”. Thus, they said that more and more performance incentives were being 
phased out and in their place new key performance indicators were being brought in. As a 
result, at Company A meeting certain objectives, which used to be rewarded with vouchers 
and bonuses for referring customers to the affiliated repair garages for example, were now 
considered part and parcel of the job and required as standard performance. At both 
companies, new and more complex telephone systems replaced the old ones so that now 
almost all work activities could be measured more accurately than before. The handlers 
mentioned that there used to be just a few codes for them to enter to indicate the reason for 
logging off the phone. Now they complained about too many codes and being under much 
closer surveillance than before, which most of them commented upon as relegating the matter 
of identifying and reporting suspicious claims to the bottom of their work priorities.  
Whereas at both companies there used to be large white boards listing the teams’ 
overall performance, now at Company A the boards listed individual performance, while at 
Company B there were now separate boards for performers and underperformers whose 
names were written down in red for everybody in the office to see. At company B consistent 
underperformance, which was defined as continual failure to process a target number of 
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claims over a month, was followed by an action plan and suggested solutions, like having to 
make up for missed targets by working overtime.  
Company A used to put the primary emphasis on the quality of customer service 
experience so that the handlers had more time for claims-processing and inspection of 
suspicious cases. Now it was the quantity of processed claims that was most important and 
even the staff that used to work exclusively as quality controllers were tasked with claims-
taking. Whereas at both companies the quality feedback used to be very regular, it was now 
sporadic and focused on errors rather than on praise. Consequently, just like during the first 
ethnographic study a few years ago (Morley et al., 2006), at both companies the claims 
handlers received almost no information on the suspicious leads that they could identify from 
a list of fraud indicators that were now simpler and shorter than before. Used as a heuristic, a 
fraud indicator describes a factor assumed to be indicative of potential fraud. While 
commercial confidentiality does not allow for publishing all such indicators, some of them 
have been shown to actually facilitate fraud (Palasinski, 2009).  It is thus apparent that their 
simplified and nuance-lacking versions, which are meant to help the downsized fraud 
departments with quicker approval or repudiation of claims, almost inevitably let the more 
complex and suspicious cases “slip through the net.”  
At both companies, team meetings and “huddles,” during which new procedures, 
objectives and general feedback were announced, were now much less regular and team 
communication was by and large reduced to impersonal emails and paper brochures. At 
neither company could the handlers recall any formal training since the Crisis began. They 
were also unanimous about having to combine different roles that used to be exclusively 
allocated to different employees. Thus at Company A, the motor insurance staff were now 
asked to deal with the notification of household claims. Although they were sent email 
instructions of how to fill in the household claim form and they could count on the assistance 
of the team leader, who also took claims when the work volume was high, they received no 
separate list of household fraud indicators and no household fraud training.  
At Company B, the claims handlers now had to deal with additional administrative 
tasks that used to be given to the back offices that were recently closed and partially 
offshored. They were also given the responsibility for investigating suspicious claims that 
used to be allocated to the now non-existent fraud team. Such new responsibility involved 
checking new claims for very broadly defined “anomalies” and fraud indicators, contacting 
claimants, brokers, repair garages, GPs and the police about any information that might 
clarify the circumstances surrounding a claim. For example, if a described accident appeared 
to be minor and all four passengers tried to claim for whiplash injury or if the claimant 
insisted on using his own repairer garage and his repair quote seemed to be too high, then the 
handlers were required to stop dealing with new claims and focus on the suspicious one.  
Notwithstanding such new workload, it was not rewarded as, like before the Crisis, 
there were no incentives for identifying and reporting cases that were eventually classed as 
fraudulent. On the contrary, the time spent on investigating such cases worked against the 
handlers and affected their productivity figures that were directly related to their performance 
assessment. At Company A, the fraud department remained a separate organizational unit, 
but its members were required not to spend more than the average of 30 minutes on 
suspicious cases, “unless dealing with unusual and complex circumstances.” When the work 
volume was high, they were now also asked to work as normal claims handlers, which they 
reported to take them approximately 25% of their time. Consequently, both the claims 
handling and fraud staff were observed to take a number of shortcuts to comply with the new 
company procedures and to avoid missing their new productivity targets. For example, rather 
than contacting all the available witnesses, they would contact only one or focus on only 
those whose statements expedited claims-processing. They would also focus on only selective 
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leads and on sources fitting the version of events that were conducive to setting the claim 
quickly, referring only the most complex cases, like those involving very serious injury or 
unusually high cost, to loss adjusters and fraud managers.  
 At both companies, it was evident that the skills of the staff were grossly 
underutilized. For example, at Company A one quarter of the experienced claims handlers 
(comprising around 35% of the junior staff who were employed for more than 3 years) were 
degree holders, but they admitted not to have received any special training or development 
track that would tap into their skills. In contrast, there were some of such opportunities at 
Company B, where one fifth of the experienced staff (comprising around 30% of the junior 
staff who were employed for more than 3 years) were degree holders. However, most of the 
opportunities were limited to coordinating a small team and were repeatedly described as not 
much more financially attractive to make up for the additional administrative responsibilities 
and greater job uncertainty.  
At both companies, most of the staff indirectly complained about an increasingly 
demoralizing atmosphere of depersonalization, boredom and sterile “brain-cell” killing 
environment, where critical thinking was discouraged and “robot-like” behavior was 
rewarded. One can easily notice that their knowledge of the bottom-up processes combined 
with the analytical skills that some of them could hone during their studies might provide 
new insights into organizational anti-fraud processes that their supervisors were isolated 
from. Despite some opportunities to share such knowledge at both companies, for example in 
the form of a suggestion box or solutions board, there was no system in place that would 
financially reward good ideas.  
Most of the staff I interacted with also admitted that the employee satisfaction surveys 
that they were required to complete on the computer could be easily traced back to them and 
hence they could not be really as anonymous as they were presented by the supervisors. On a 
positive note, compared with the working environment before the Crisis, it was clear that 
certain organizational processes conducive to tackling fraud improved a little. At both 
companies, new claims that used to be dealt with by different staff at different stages were 
now allocated to particular individuals, facilitating communication and creating a much 
greater sense of ownership. There was also greater access to new and automatically updated 
software, enabling a much quicker and more flexible look into the history of a given 
claimant, car or address than it was the case before, yet the training in its usage was reported 
by the junior staff as minimal. 
 
The perspectives of team leaders and supervisors 
 
When asked about the new changes in the last three years, the team leaders and 
supervisors at Company A and Company B were respectively quite positive and very positive 
about them. They spoke of the greater workload in terms of developing the staff, improving 
the organizational health of the business and increasing its competitiveness on the market. At 
Company A, they presented the tasking of the motor claims handlers with the notification of 
household claims as not only adding variety to the job, but also increasing their employability 
and promotional prospects in general. Lacking any formal training and qualifications in 
household claims, the supervisors stated that household fraudsters would operate very 
similarly to motor fraudsters, emphasizing that the best strategy of tackling fraud was using 
“common sense” and sticking to the same fraud indicators that were already used in motor 
insurance. They said that they did not see the need to rephrase some of the indicators in 
household terminology to facilitate their better use as “the slight differences in wording were 
obvious.” 
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 At Company A, where the fraud department remained a separate organizational unit, 
they were in agreement that giving the fraud staff the average of 30 minutes on suspicious 
cases was sufficient. They also presented the tasking of the fraud staff with claims-taking as 
only occasional and unlikely to take them more than 10% of their time, although the fraud 
staff described it as regular and consuming approximately 25% of their time. Along similar 
lines, at Company B asking the claims handlers to deal with additional administrative tasks 
and adopt the role of fraud investigators was presented as tapping into the handlers’ insider’s 
knowledge, which, I was told, would be of greater relevance than relying on the ex-fraud 
team members who were isolated from direct customer contact. At neither company was the 
issue of taking shortcuts and conflict with productivity targets mentioned spontaneously, but 
when I raised it at Company A I was advised that it was one of the main reasons why they 
kept the claims and fraud departments as separate organizational units. At Company B, I was 
told that the closer monitoring would not allow for “cutting corners” and hence there was 
little conflict between investigating fraud and hitting productivity targets as the staff would 
simply have to follow their basic guidelines.  
Most of the supervisors at both companies presented the closer monitoring as enabling 
the business to provide insurance policy holders with better quality customer service that 
could be excellent each and every time. They also commented on the performance boards as 
being now more detailed and personalized, helping them quickly identify who needed extra 
support and training. The supervisors acknowledged that some of the more experienced 
claims handlers could now find the greater surveillance uncomfortable, but they also argued 
that it was simply a matter of getting used to it, and that it was not a problem for new 
employees who did not work under the “old” system before the Crisis.  
Thus, as the supervisors at Company A put it, “pampering the staff with perks simply 
for doing their job” was no longer justified. At Company B, they argued that giving certain 
incentives, like those for correctly identifying fraudulent cases could distract the claims 
handlers from doing their job – indemnifying policy holders. At both companies, the 
supervisors described their shorter list of simplified fraud indicators as more efficient and 
effective. They admitted that there was already an established approach of accepting the costs 
of declines in fraud detection as a trade off for a much more efficient throughput, but denied 
putting such an approach in imbalance, although the new trade off remained uncalculated.   
At Company A, the team leaders and supervisors argued that both quantity and quality 
were equally important, but given the new set of control measures and closer monitoring, the 
claims handlers “had now a better opportunity to focus on their productivity” and “work their 
way up through their motivation and efforts rather than tricks.” They also presented the 
tasking of quality controllers with normal claims-processing as a way of way of diversifying 
their workload and keeping them up to date with bottom-up processes. At both companies, 
they explained that error avoidance and increased productivity should be top priorities for the 
handlers, stating that hitting the set targets would also be recognized during the annual staff 
appraisal.  
At both companies, they described the communication through emails and paper 
brochures as fast, easy and clear; emphasizing that formal meeting would still be organized if 
bigger changes in procedures were to be implemented. Additional training for the 
experienced staff was labeled as “superfluous” or “impractical” as it was stated that the best 
training, including the anti-fraud training, was the actual practice. Whereas at Company A 
new starters would be sat among the more experienced staff, which appears to be conducive 
to fostering an effective learning environment, at Company B they would be clustered 
together and encouraged to learn from one another with the support of an experienced team 
leader. The latter approach seems to allow for the sharing and consolidation of errors that 
might be left unchecked by the busy team leader who was not always available.   
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With regards to the staff development, the supervisors at both companies emphasized 
that it was their priority to recruit and retain only the best people, but they denied that 
graduates would necessarily be any better than school leavers. At Company A, promotional 
opportunities were presented as “open to anybody with the right skills and attitude,” whereas 
at Company B they were presented as most available for the internal staff with experience 
rather than “pretentious and arrogant graduates with no real business knowledge.” At 
Company A, it was explained to me, every year a few junior staff with top performance 
scores could qualify for management training, but it was clear that correctly identifying 
fraudulent claims would not be measured and would not be reflected in the scores. As a 
result, highly productive individuals with little proven anti-fraud effectiveness or anti-fraud 
training could end up advising and managing fraud teams. At Company B, I was told, there 
was no formal promotional track for the staff to join, but everybody was personally 
responsible for their development and that “people with the right ideas would be 
automatically referred further.” Nonetheless, I could not get a clearer definition of such a 
referral or what it would involve.  
The supervisors at both companies stated that the changes introduced to the business 
in the last three years had a very stimulating impact on all the staff, diversifying their roles 
and developing their skills. At Company A, they stated that the sheer number of the still-
ongoing changes would keep their business a dynamic place for many months to come, while 
at Company B they argued that many of their staff, who had been indirectly complaining  
 of monotony and boredom before, were now tasked with additional duties to satisfy their 
need for extra stimulation. No clear steps, however, were taken to match the additional duties 
to the claimants' skills or to assess their impact on fraud detection practices.  
At both companies, the supervisors argued that the simplified procedures and 
guidelines must have had a general positive impact on the work quality “as the staff were 
now relieved from having to overanalyze a number of common scenarios.” They explained 
that they were open to suggestions and solutions recommended by the claims and fraud staff, 
and that although it would be impractical to reward all of them individually, they might play 
a role in promotion and their creators would be recognized during the annual performance 
appraisal. The mangers also presented themselves as open to criticism and assured me that 
despite the computerized forms, all employee satisfaction surveys were anonymous and 
individually untraceable. 
Despite heavier workload, new targets and downsizing, at both companies they 
described the general organizational processes as modernized and streamlined. The improved 
access to the latest commercially available anti-fraud software was said to offset the 
possibility that the junior staff, who were tasked with extra duties, might fail to spot 
fraudulent claims. It was also clear that more resources were invested in fraud screening 
technology than in training the staff to spot and investigate their suspicious. Such an 
approach appears to be in conducive to limiting financial leakage as it was already observed 
in the earlier pre-Crisis ethnographic research that it is the front-line staff who are best 
positioned to spot and investigate anomalies (Morley et al., 2006). 
 At both companies, the supervisors spoke with confidence about the ability of their 
staff to use and interpret the data from the anti-fraud software, although every claims 
handler I had interacted with advised me that they could not fully operate it or that they could 
only use its basic functions. At Company A, the supervisors told me that there were plans for 
training their staff to better use such software, but they would not specify their nature or 
timescale. At Company B, they said that the new anti-fraud technology would allow them to 
keep only a few very well-trained claims handlers on whose expertise the majority of the 
future less experienced staff could rely.  
 




Following Van Rooy et al.’s (2011) strong recommendation for measuring workforce 
attitudes, especially during an economic downturn, this study gives insight into contrastingly 
different stances on the impact that a major downsizing seems to have on anti-fraud 
resources. Thus, the team leaders and supervisors, most of whom were isolated from bottom-
up business processes, did not appear to be fully aware of the effects of the new changes. At 
both companies, they held a number of unjustified assumptions about tackling fraud, like 
stating that household insurance fraudsters would operate similarly to car insurance fraudsters 
and over-relying on anti-fraud software rather than on training their staff. They also seemed 
oblivious to the fact that the closer monitoring, higher productivity targets and no feedback 
on even successfully identified fraudulent claims had an apparently demoralizing impact on 
the staff, some of whom openly admitted that following their suspicions adversely affected 
their performance figures and was not really an aspect of their responsibility.  
It appears most of the recommendations by Morley et al. (2006) have been ignored 
and many of their opposites have been accepted. The two companies have failed to offer 
incentives for reporting anomalies, adding new disincentives, making training opportunities 
even less regular and increasing communication via impersonal emails. It seems that tasking 
junior staff with many extra duties has also hampered the integration of fraud-detection 
methods with claims handling. Although better anti-fraud software was now more available, 
at both companies the experienced junior staff admitted to not knowing how to fully use its 
potential. On a positive note, however, it must be mentioned that both companies increased a 
degree of ownership of claims.  
It is apparent that most of the analysed efficiency measures, including increased 
pressure and limited feedback, may not just fail to facilitate the detection and reporting of 
insurance fraud, but are actually likely to have an adverse effect, which probably impairs very 
important aspects of operational performance. What the supervisors described as 
“multitasking,” “faster communication,” and “closer monitoring,” the junior staff often 
referred to as respectively “growing pressure,” “impersonal emails,” and “intrusive 
surveillance.” Such juxtapositions between the respective mitigation (Van Dijk, 1992) and 
extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) offer a glimpse into two contrasting discursive 
worlds. Whether or not such a contrast is apocryphal is less significant than the effect it 
appears to have on relegating the matter of investigating suspicious claims to a place of 
secondary importance. 
The junior staff, however, did not seem to be completely cynical about all the 
organizational changes, although they showed quite a high degree of change-specific 
scepticism. Using Stanley, Meyer, and Topolnytsky’s (2005) distinction between scepticism 
and cynicism, which they also find to be closely correlated and potentially causal, it appears 
that the junior staff were more doubtful about the viability of the changes than about the 
ulterior motives for implementing them. Could, then, they be closer to the “reality” of the 
situation than their team leaders and supervisors?  
Notwithstanding the considerable differences in their perspectives on that “reality,” 
one must bear in mind that they could be equally valid on the grounds of different value 
systems and metrics. In other words, given the salience of heavier workload, more intensive 
performance monitoring, fewer rewards for good performance, removal of team performance 
metrics, lack of formal training opportunities and reduced focus on customer service, the 
evaluation of the restructuring by the junior staff was almost unanimously pejorative. In 
contrast, by emphasizing improved organisational health, increased market competitiveness, 
greater job variety and capitalising on insider knowledge, the team leaders and supervisors 
had sound reasons to view the organizational changes in positive terms.  
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In this light, it might be inaccurate to claim that the junior staff were simply right and 
“in the loop” and their supervisors were wrong and “out of touch.” The situation might be 
more complex and heavily dependent on what financial impact rejecting suspicious claims 
has had in comparison with the pre-downsizing time. Until such data is available (at the time 
of finishing this manuscript it is not) and is subjected to detailed statistical analyses, which is 
compounded by the subjectivity and ambiguity of what constitutes suspicious claims (e.g., 
there were no guidelines on whether non-verbal clues were more important than the logical 
ones) it is premature to claim that downsizing and efficiency measures must have an 
inevitably negative impact on anti-fraud resources.  
All this study shows, then, is that it is likely to be the case, which lends support to a 
separate exploration that would take into account the full financial balance sheets. However, 
extrapolating from the comprehensive model treating downsizing programs the same as any 
other projected investment by a firm (Birati & Tziner, 2000), the very (surprising) absence of 
even restructuring-adjusted estimates of fraud-linked leakage can be quite fairly interpreted in 
terms of insufficient control, high risk and presumptuousness, suggesting that the general 
effect of the (clearly under-planned) downsizing on anti-fraud resources is probably indeed 
negative. That said, what I hope to have achieved is to demonstrate that examining individual 
aspects of operational performance, like fraud detection and fraud reporting, through the lens 
of resource-based theory can represent an insightful and practical approach shedding unique 
qualitative light that would be obscured if a traditionally general analysis of downsizing was 
used. Highlighting the implications from a contextualised resource-based theory, I conclude 
that the anti-fraud resources apparently should not be subject to the same levels of untested 
downsizing and efficiency as other business resources. To do otherwise, is to risk too many 
fraudulent claims to “slip through the net,” unless it turns out that the costs of declines in 
fraud detection will be a beneficial trade off for a much more efficient throughput, which the 
senior staff expected, but could not estimate or calculate yet. 
Naturally, a few words of caution are due. Even though the junior staff at both 
companies were almost uniformly critical of the significant changes in their job tasks and 
routines, it is likely that the newly hired staff, whose perspectives were not analyzed due to 
the inexperience of the pre-Crisis processes and procedures, could be more positive about the 
changes. Could they then perform better than the “older” staff? Given the greatly increased 
complexity of the procedural tasks, as well as the longer and expensive process of training, it 
would be logical to suspect that at least in the short-run they most likely could not. The 
question about their long-term performance is complicated by the high call-center staff 
turnover (Morley et al., 2006), individual differences (Koberg, Chesley, & Heppard, 2000) 
and how managers respond to the anxiety (Richardson & Denton, 1996), decreased morale 
(Mishra et al., 2009) and frustration (Luthans & Sommer, 1999) of their workers.  
It must also be mentioned that despite the efforts to try to minimize subjectivity, the 
analysis and conclusions were probably shaped by my individual preconceptions, knowledge 
and expectations - the elements which Seale et al. (2004) present as an inevitable and natural 
part of qualitative research. Although alternative definitions and theoretical frameworks 
could have been used in this exploration (Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, & Pandey, 2010), I 
hypothesize that they would lead to quite similar conclusions, which also paves the way for 
confirmatory research. Despite Hammersley’s (1990) criticism of the ethnographic method 
on the grounds of relatively limited validity and reliability, Borland (2001) argues that the 
issue of balancing subjectivity and objectivity, representativeness and selective sampling, as 
well as generalizability and uniqueness has been relevant to social sciences in general. 
LeCompte and Preissle (1982) even criticize such dichotomous divisions themselves. Given 
the parallels between the two companies, the described processes and their implications are 
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likely to be relevant to a wider sector of the downsized and more and more efficiency-driven 
insurance industry, which should be explored in other research.  
Such research might take into account other factors, like layoff survivors’ work ethic, 
role ambiguity and job involvement (Brockner, Grover, & Blonder, 1988), as well as self-
esteem (Brockner, Grover, O’Malley, Reed, & Glynn, 1993; Wiesenfeld, Brockner, & 
Thibault, 2000), organizational commitment and perceived control (Brockner et al., 2004). 
Exploring the post-Crisis effects of such a major restructuring would also provide us with a 
fuller longitudinal perspective, which is both a timely and important matter. It appears, 
however, that insurance managers do not tend implement recommendations from academics, 
leaving room for future research that might focus on how to enhance cooperation between 
them. Why it is the case is naturally speculative, but it seems that continuous doubts about 
academia (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002) and its perception as ivory tower detached from “business 
reality” (Hershberg, Nabeshima, & Yusuf, 2007) are worth taking into consideration, the 
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Appendix 
Table 1  




changes generally criticized  
emails and paper brochures described as obstructing communication 
the importance of fraud identification and reporting minimized 
complaints about constantly increasing workload and closer monitoring 
complaints about depersonalization, boredom and routines   
performance incentives phased out  
new key performance indicators brought in 
new and more complex telephone systems replacing the old ones  
less regular and error-focused feedback 
less regular and shorter team meetings 
increased multitasking without sufficient training 
no system in place that would financially reward good ideas 
new claims now allocated fully to particular individuals 





no special training or development track for employed graduates at Company A 
boards listing individual performance at Company A 
less emphasis on customer service at Company A  
quality controllers and fraud staff tasked with claims-taking at Company A 
junior staff tasked with household claims at Company A 
junior staff tasked with new administrative tasks at Company B 
junior staff tasked with investigating suspicious claims at Company B 
separate boards for performers and underperformers at Company B 
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Table 2  
Perspectives on Major Post-downsizing Changes in the Two Companies by the Team Leaders 
and Supervisors 
 
Similarities   
 
changes generally approved 
changes described as skill-developing and efficiency-improving 
emails and paper brochures described as facilitating communication  
error avoidance and increased productivity described as top priorities 
increased workload described in terms of improving the staff and business 
closer monitoring described as facilitating better quality customer service  
additional training for the experienced staff described as unnecessary 
performance boards described as early problem-spotting systems 
anti-fraud software described as offsetting reduced time for suspicious claims 
shorter lists of simplified fraud indicators described as more effective 
declines in fraud detection assumed to be a trade off for greater efficiency 
taking shortcuts and conflict with productivity not mentioned spontaneously 
recruitment and retention of only the best people emphasized 





household fraudsters assumed to operate like motor fraudsters at Company A 
tasking fraud staff with claims-taking described as only occasional at Company A 
rewarding staff for good performance described as unjustified at Company A 
new starters placed among the more experienced staff at Company A 
plans for training the junior staff to better use anti-fraud software at Company A 
mostly external and formal promotional opportunities at Company A 
mostly internal and informal promotional opportunities at Company B 
tasking junior staff with  admin tasks described as smart at Company B 
closer monitoring described as minimizing multitasking conflict at Company B 
rewarding staff performance described as distracting at Company B 
new starters clustered together at Company B 
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